the military skills to exercise this option are out of practice, Joint Forcible Entry provides the U.S. with an essential capacity to deter conflict, project power and defeat opponents. Armed with a proliferation of new technology brought about by globalization, hostile state and non-state actors are becoming increasingly capable of limiting U.S. access to the global commons and to their territories. If unchecked, these impending infringements on our nation's global freedom of movement will injure our national credibility, diminish our national power and threaten our national security. The U.S. must sustain a credible Airborne Joint Forcible Entry capacity as an option for the President.
Airborne Joint Forcible Entry is a vital national capability that will dissuade our adversaries, reassure our allies and continue to assure U.S. global access and influence.
AIRBORNE JOINT FORCIBLE ENTRY: ENSURING OPTIONS FOR U.S. GLOBAL RESPONSE
When [the] USA loses the ability to forcibly enter another's terrain, we've surrendered our influence in a world where that surrender won't play well.
-GEN James N. Mattis
The United States is currently the world's preeminent power. It boasts the world's largest and most vibrant economy and it possesses an unmatched military. Its representative government, although imperfect, is a source of democratic inspiration around the world.
As the world's dominant superpower, U.S. interests span the globe. In order for our military to reinforce these national interests, the U.S. Joint Force must maintain global freedom of movement, or Operational access, both in the global commons 2 and the sovereign territories of other nations when required. 3 Operational access supports U.S. freedom of movement and our global interests by providing access to commerce, the ability to project military force globally to manage crisis, prevent war, or defeat enemies of the nation in war. 4 In concert with national diplomatic, informational and economic efforts, our Joint Force provides operational access that secures Assured access for the nation. Assured access is the "unhindered national use of the global commons and sovereign territory, waters, airspace and cyberspace." 5 When adversaries of the U.S. or our coalition partners seek to limit or deny us access and influence in any region, the Joint Force is prepared to provide access using Joint Forcible Entry.
The rising power of potential adversaries, both states and non-state actors, are again threatening our access to the global commons, much as Germany threatened the sea lanes in World War II. Our adversaries are also acquiring and implementing technologies that challenge our military dominance and seek to limit our access and operational maneuver. These impending infringements on our nation's global freedom of movement can injure our national credibility, detract from our national power and threaten our national security.
Our credible capability to conduct Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO)
underwrites our global freedom of movement. JFEO provides operational access for our joint military forces and our coalition partners, which in turn provides assured access for our nation and our partnered nations. The U.S. ability to project force over strategic distances and forcibly enter other nations' territories is unmatched among the world's powers and it must be preserved. Our distinctive JFEO capability not only ensures U.S.
access, it assures our allies and deters those adversaries that would otherwise challenge us. Sacrificing our JFEO capability will dramatically relegate the U.S. stature, influence and power worldwide. The U.S. cannot realistically accomplish the objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy without the real power to deter and defeat currently provided by our creditable JFEO capability. This paper will demonstrate that the U.S. airborne JFEO capability is a vital national enabler to extend combat power, deter our adversaries and assure our allies.
First, the paper will provide an examination of select historical examples that illustrate the benefits that a JFEO capability provides the nation. Next, it will examine emerging political, technological, fiscal and other environmental challenges that our nation and military must overcome to retain a credible national JFEO capacity. Finally, the paper will outline recommendations for the nation and the Joint Force to best organize, train and sustain the force to maximize the deterrence and defeat potential provided by our JFEO capability.
Joint Forcible Entry Operations Doctrine
The military community recognizes the importance of assured and operational access and its symbiotic relationship with our national power and our national security.
Understanding the potential negative impacts of an increasingly complex environment on our global national freedom of movement, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has directed a thorough update of joint doctrine to ensure continued U.S. global access. Joint Publication 3-18 (Joint Forcible Entry Operations) outlines the Joint Force methodology that will enable sustained operational access in the most challenging scenario-contested environments.
Joint Publication 3-18 defines Forcible Entry (FE) as a "joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary,"
typically to seize a lodgment 6 and enable follow on operations. 7 JFEO doctrinally seeks to achieve one of three operational purposes: establish a lodgment for continued operations, establish multiple, linked lodgments to support a campaign, or to conduct singular operations. contributions of the USMC and the U.S. Army to our national JFEO capability are equally important. However, this paper will limit the scope of study to Airborne JFEO, which is a capability uniquely provided by U.S. Army formations.
As noted above, the amphibious, air assault and airborne forces that contribute to our national JFEO capability are equally important. A large U.S. force such as this one provides the nation with significant deterrent power and an ability to shape the political environment to achieve its objectives. Although there are many excellent historical examples where the President chose JFEO to achieve national objectives, these two operations clearly demonstrate its capacity to rapidly deliver overwhelming combat power and its corresponding deterrent power. Airborne JFEO provides a clear and decisive military option to strategic problems and complements our national diplomatic, information and economic efforts.
Our military's JFEO capability is one of the most visible and vital contributions to the nation's deterrent power. When put into action, JFEO also powerfully assure our allies and demonstrate explicit U.S. resolve and commitment. Using our history as the greatest predictor, U.S. leadership will continue to rely on the Joint Force to provide JFEO as an essential element of our national power.
National Security Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations
Each of our national security strategy documents published since 2008 contains a common thread that underlines the importance of maintaining our national JFEO capability. The common theme describes deterring and defeating the aggression of our adversaries in increasingly sophisticated operating environments around the globe.
Although the nation will employ diplomatic, informational and economic means to deter and defeat our enemies, it cannot expect to achieve its objectives without military power. One of the most visible and effective deter and defeat mechanisms provided by our military is our JFEO capability. JFEO allow the rapid and overwhelming projection of U.S. combat power to locations across the globe, both in uncontested and contested environments. President Obama underscores this requirement in the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) when he states, "The United States remains the only nation able to project and sustain large-scale military operations over extended distances. We maintain superior capabilities to deter and defeat adaptive enemies…." 20 The 2008 National Defense Strategy serves as the bridge between the NSS and the National Military Strategy (NMS). In this capstone document, the Secretary of Defense outlines two critical areas that support the requirement to maintain our JFEO capability. The first echoes the President's words on our ability to deter, which he defines as "influencing the political and military choices of an adversary, dissuading it from taking an action by making its leaders understand that either the cost of the action is too great, is of no use, or unnecessary." 21 Our long history of employing effective JFEO advertises credibility and therefore deterrence. Our deterrence credibility also serves to assure our Allies and the American public of the nation's ability and intent to defend them. 22 Conversely, an inability to perform JFEO would signal a national inability to deter, and would therefore gravely weaken our national capability to deter and dissuade our adversaries. The second proposition supporting the maintenance of our national JFEO capability is that "The U.S. requires freedom of action in the global commons and strategic access to important regions of the world to meet our national security needs." 23 By definition, JFEO provides a military solution to this requirement in the most challenging condition, which is against armed opposition to entry.
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) unites the guidance outlined in the NSS and the NDS, with the purpose of rebalancing the capabilities of our military forces to win wars and to build the capabilities to counter future threats. 24 This important document stresses the fact that the U.S. is the only nation that can project and sustain major operations over extended distances. 25 It then links this unique, unmatched capacity to our ability to deter our adversaries and reassure the U.S. public and our He notes that our ability to deter is paramount, stating that "Preventing wars is important as winning them, and far less costly." 28 With respect to deterring adversaries and defeating aggression, Admiral Mullen notes that our core military competencies must include JFEO and the ability to ensure joint assured access to the global commons when they are contested. Globalization is leveling the playing field and in the process diminishing U.S. national power relative to the remainder of the world.
Together, the increasingly complex operating environment and the gradual growth of capable adversaries threaten U.S. global access. Our adversaries' power is no longer limited to the strength of its military, but now resides in its "interconnected political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems." 32 Adversarial governments, once deterred by the military overmatch wielded by the U.S., now openly challenge our freedom of movement. These strategies, commonly referred to as anti-access (A2) and area-denial (AD), seek to prevent entry of military forces into a theater of operations (A2) and further seek to limit military freedom of action in the areas under a nation's direct control (AD).
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Globalization and the Proliferation of Technology: Empowering Our Adversaries For several decades, U.S. ability to project military force to regions around the globe has been essentially unopposed. 34 However, as outlined above, the forces of our current complex environment threaten to diminish this capability. Admiral Jay Johnson, as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), predicted over ten years ago that our enemies would eventually strive to counter U.S. might. He anticipated that enemy nations would target concentrations of U.S. troops and materiel on the ground, in the air and at sea.
Additionally, he projected that the U.S. ability to counter the area-denial threat would stand as the "single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military power where it is needed." 35 To describe the multitude of technologies now widely available to U.S. adversaries falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, as an example, weapons such as the Russian-made S-300 missile now have the potential to destroy U.S. airborne aircraft, cruise missiles and even ballistic missiles. The Russians have sold thousands of these weapons to countries across Asia, Europe and the Middle East. 36 These weapons are slowly narrowing the large technological advantage that the U.S. has enjoyed since the end of World War II and are placing our operational and assured access at heightened levels of risk.
Potential adversary nations also possess and continue to improve enhanced integrated air defense systems (IADS) and some even possess the ability to target satellites that provide U.S. and coalition forces with global positioning, communication and mapping services. The increased availability of precision, long range weaponry to our adversaries provides them with a capability not only to target U.S. and coalition ships, aircraft and satellites, but also U.S. bases and staging areas. Unprecedented advancements in enemy capabilities now threaten our service members, their equipment and U.S. infrastructure at previously unopposed staging and transit locations around the world. These vulnerabilities to our power projection capability further accentuate the requirement for a credible national JFEO capacity.
The diffusion and proliferation of technology is not limited to advanced weapon systems. Both states and non-state actors can now communicate across strategic distances and even access satellite imagery and sophisticated mapping resources using the internet, satellite communications and cellular technology. Each of these communication mediums was birthed in the U.S. and provides positive benefit to the world daily, yet each can be utilized by our adversaries to limit access and diminish the effectiveness of our JFEO. Our adversaries are hijacking the technologies that support increased prosperity and stability for the majority of the world to reduce freedom of movement of the U.S. and our allies. The national leadership must recognize that these threats are destabilizing the global environment, eroding our JFEO capacity, and diminishing U.S. assured access. The U.S. must take prudent steps to limit or reverse these negative effects and preserve our ability to project power and maintain global freedom of movement. To accomplish this task, the Joint Force must continue to improve its JFEO capacity in anti-access environments, in concert with other DoD and Joint initiatives such as Air-Sea Battle 37 and Long Range Strike be CONUS-based. 41 As the administration continues to direct reductions in military force structure and withdraw forces to the continental U.S., it is essential that we maintain the right combination of forward-deployed forces and staging and transit support locations to facilitate our national JFEO capacity. U.S. Global force posture must support the objectives of National Security Strategy and must support a viable JFEO capability.
Failure to maintain critical bases for staging and transit support or removal of sufficient forward-deployed rapid reaction forces that can quickly respond to crisis would constitute strategic error and could dramatically diminish our national JFEO capacity.
As an example of supporting a forward-deployed airborne JFEO structure, the Joint Force should strongly consider leaving an airborne capable IBCT in both Europe and in Alaska. Although these two IBCTs are probably two of the most expensive IBCTs because of their basing costs, these brigades support the EUCOM and PACOM Commanders with JFEO-capable airborne rapid reaction forces. In two extremely important unified command areas of responsibility, these brigades demonstrate U.S.
resolve, dissuade and deter our adversaries, and provide the President and the combatant commanders with a creditable, versatile and viable JFEO capability.
The U.S. government must ensure that it retains the right combination of JFEOcapable forces at CONUS and OCONUS bases. Our senior military leadership must ensure that the military force is drawn down responsibly, so that our national JFEO capability is not sacrificed in the impending cuts to military force structure and overseas basing.
International Political Pressure and Restrictions on U.S. Basing and Transit Rights
In addition to the fiscal pressures and force structure and basing issues mentioned above, political issues are also challenging our operational and assured access. Restrictions on U.S. access and transit rights are both a strong reason for the U.S. to maintain a JFEO capability and a challenge to our current capability. In reviewing these factors that presently challenge our freedom of maneuver and our global access, it is both readily evident and paramount that the U.S. retain the capability to rapidly project decisive military ground combat power into contested territories worldwide. JFEO provides the U.S. with a capability to deter and defeat our adversaries, respond to crisis, or promote peace and stability. Sacrificing our national JFEO capacity diminishes our national power, our preeminence on the world stage and ultimately undermines our national security. As eloquently summarized by the Honorable Robert Work:
Any perception that American forces might not be able to gain or sustain access or influence in regions of national interest could severely undercut American diplomacy and deterrence. We must never concede limits to our own strategic and operational freedom of action in the global commons where we and our allies have vital interests. noted that this process typically results in a weaker, rather than a stronger national security. Mr. Panetta stated that he is "determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past." 48 We must not sacrifice our national JFEO capability for budgetary reasons. Barno recommends that the Army not forfeit its JFEO capability. He recommends that after cuts, remaining active-duty Army forces focus on rapid response and forcible entry, notably airborne and helicopter assault." 49 Another key point that highlights the necessity to retain our JFEO capability is that the U.S. capability is unique among our allies. Although our most capable allies in NATO (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) can conduct airborne operations, only the U.S. possesses sufficient aircraft and the required enablers to conduct large scale JFEO in a contested environment. JFE is one military capability where the U.S.
cannot depend on a NATO contribution or for our allies to conduct independent JFEO.
In this respect, the U.S. JFEO capability is analogous to an endangered species. The risk of losing this national capability could be catastrophic to our national security strategy.
In today's globalizing economy, the fiscal pressures currently facing the U.S. are also impacting our allies. Our NATO allies are downsizing their militaries and like the U.S., potentially divesting capabilities in the process. As U.S. partners like Australia begin to consider cutting their expensive JFEO capabilities, 50 it becomes even more critical that we retain our unique JFEO capacity. In an increasingly complex and globalized international environment, it is likely that the U.S. will become more dependent on the contributions and capabilities of our allies. If our allies cannot readily contribute to JFEO, it is essential that the U.S. safeguard its unique JFEO capability.
A further threat to our national JFEO capability is organizational threat-that is, 
Recommendations
The 2011 U.S. NMS directs that the military "retain the ability to project power into distant, anti-access environments." 54 This instruction is much easier issued than accomplished, in light of the numerous external and internal challenges described in this paper. Despite abundant challenges, however, the Joint Force must swiftly mitigate both external and internal issues that currently undermine our JFEO capability. The Joint even purposefully reducing or eliminating our national airborne JFEO capability is imprudent and irresponsible given the current nature of the global environment and the places U.S. national security at risk. This study demonstrates that our senior military leadership fully understands the importance of JFEO; however the CJCS must ensure that our civilian leadership acknowledge and confirm its value. As Nathan Freier advises, "…if an under-appreciation of the potential demand leads to reductions in forcible entry capabilities,…future decision makers' options could be greatly reduced" 57 .
Given the condition of our nation's growing deficit, most military and civilian leaders agree that we must make cuts to Joint Force structure and personnel. However, these reductions must be accomplished in a responsible manner with full recognition and alignment of national ends, ways and means.
After ensuring the nation's leadership understands the criticality of our JFEO capability, the SECDEF and CJCS must align doctrine, force structure, and basing to sustain and grow our JFEO capability despite all of the challenges. In restructuring the total force, the CJCS should retain all six of the airborne-capable IBCTs, to include the airborne brigades in Italy and Alaska that provide a rapid reaction JFEO capability for the EUCOM and PACOM combatant commanders. In the ongoing restructuring and realignment process, the CJCS should also ensure that at least three Army Corps HQs 
Conclusion
In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Obama called for the military to rebalance its capability and be prepared to provide a full range of military operations, including the ability to defeat our enemies in an anti-access environment. 60 To assure U.S. access to the global commons and to any foreign sovereign territory in support of national objectives, the U.S. military must remain ready and able to provide rapid, global operational access in both uncontested and contested environments. The capacity of the Joint Force to conduct JFEO meets the challenge of this Presidential directive. In the recently published "Joint Operational Access Concept," which describes how the U.S. military will gain entry and ensure access in emerging Anti-Access/Area Denial environments, Joint Forcible Entry is one of thirty vital capabilities to ensure U.S.
access. 61 This paper demonstrates that airborne JFEO are an essential component of the nation's complete JFEO capability and that a credible JFEO capacity is vital to U.S. security strategy. It further demonstrates that an increasingly complex international environment and the emergence of exceedingly capable adversaries will challenge our operational access and national security in the near future. We can no longer take for granted our capability to project combat power into contested environments. As Nathan 2 President Obama discusses the adversarial threat to U.S. global freedom of movement and its potential negative impact on the nation's global security and prosperity, and defines the global commons in his January 2012 decree, Priorities for 21 st Century Defense: "To enable economic growth and commerce, America, working in conjunction with allies and partners around the world, will seek to protect freedom of access throughout the global commons -those areas beyond national jurisdiction that constitute the vital connective tissue of the international system. Global security and prosperity are increasingly dependent on the free flow of goods shipped by air or sea. State and non-state actors pose potential threats to access in the global commons, whether through opposition to existing norms or other anti-access approaches." President Barack Obama, "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense," January 2012. http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_ Guidance.pdf (accessed January 5, 2012), 3.
